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Science University, Tualatin, ORA B S T R A C TBackground: Among policy alternatives considered to reduce health
care costs and improve outcomes, value-based insurance design
(VBID) has emerged as a promising option. Most applications of VBID,
however, have not used higher cost sharing to discourage speciﬁc
services. In April 2011, the state of Oregon introduced a policy for
public employees that required additional cost sharing for high-cost
procedures such as total knee arthroplasty (TKA). Objectives: Our
objectives were to estimate the societal impact of higher co-pays for
TKA using Oregon as a case study and building on recent work
demonstrating the effects of knee osteoarthritis and surgical treat-
ment on employment and disability outcomes. Methods: We used a
Markov model to estimate the societal impact in terms of quality of
life, direct costs, and indirect costs of higher co-pays for TKA usingee front matter Copyright & 2014, International S
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ndence to: Lane Koenig, KNG Health Consulting, LOregon as a case study. Results: We found that TKA for a working
population can generate societal beneﬁts that offset the direct
medical costs of the procedure. Delay in receiving surgical care,
because of higher co-payment or other reasons, reduced the societal
savings from TKA. Conclusions: We conclude that payers moving
toward value-based cost sharing should consider consequences
beyond direct medical expenses.
Keywords: cost sharing, societal beneﬁts, total knee replacement,
value-based insurance design.
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Among policy alternatives considered to reduce health care costs
and improve patient outcomes, value-based insurance design
(VBID) has emerged as a promising option [1–3]. Under VBID,
incentives are used to encourage the use of high-value services or
to discourage the use of low-value services. Some payers in the
United States, for example, have lowered or eliminated co-
payments for highly cost-effective or clinically effective outpatient
drugs or preventive programs, such as smoking cessation classes.
Thus far, most applications of VBID have not used higher cost
sharing to discourage the use of speciﬁc services. This may be about
to change. Current spending levels and the aging of the population
are creating enormous pressure to identify solutions to dampen the
growth of health care spending. There is also growing recognition
that controlling spending will likelymean greater patient cost sharing
[4]. In this context, it is not surprising that attention is increasingly
focused on the merits of a “carrot-and-stick” approach [5–8].
The state of Oregon may be a harbinger of what is to come in
the use of higher co-payments for selective treatments. In April
2011, Oregon introduced a new policy for state employees that
imposes an additional $500 co-payment on certain procedures
considered by the state to be of “low relative value” [9–11]. Many
of the services subject to the additional co-payment are surgical
procedures to treat musculoskeletal conditions, including total
knee arthroplasty (TKA) for end-stage osteoarthritis (OA). Ore-
gon’s inclusion of TKA in its VBID program is undoubtedly drivenby the procedure’s high cost and growth in utilization, partic-
ularly among those younger than 65 years [12,13]. Less clear are
the implications for societal welfare of restricting access to TKA—
a cost-effective treatment for end-stage OA [14–16].
Increased cost sharing will tend to cause patients to more
critically assess the necessity of high-cost procedures. The likely
marginal impact of the policy will be more patients choosing to
pursue a more conservative approach to care. In the case of OA of
the knee, this will typically involve patients choosing to delay
surgery until their disease advances further. This would yield
short-term savings by temporarily deferring the costs of surgery,
but would also postpone the beneﬁts of surgery.
In this article, we estimate the societal impact of higher co-
pays for TKA using Oregon as a case study and building on recent
work demonstrating the effects of knee OA and surgical treatment
on employment and disability outcomes [17,18]. Our ﬁndings point
to important considerations for future policy discussions sur-
rounding VBID and higher co-payments for knee replacement.Methods
To estimate the impact of higher co-pays for TKA, we ﬁrst
calculated the value of the procedure using a simulation model.
Our overall approach was based on Dall et al. [17] and Ruiz et al.
[18], with modiﬁcations to make the methodology applicable for a
working age population in Oregon. Except as noted below, modelociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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Table 2 – Effect of delaying total knee arthroplasty
on societal savings and QALYs.
Delay
time
Net societal savings
($)
Change in
QALYs
No delay 43,842 1.92
1 y 34,751 1.46
3 y 18,999 1.23
7 y 271 0.95
10 y 6,417 0.81
QALYs, quality-adjusted life-years.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 7 4 9 – 7 5 1750assumptions and parameters were based on Ruiz et al. Results
were generated for persons between the ages of 40 and 64 years
in 5-year age cohorts. For each age cohort, a Markov model
(presented in Ruiz et al.) was run until age 67 years when workers
were assumed to retire and obtain primary medical coverage
from Medicare. For each treatment option examined, the model
estimates both direct and indirect costs, as well as quality-
adjusted life-years (QALYs). To account for beneﬁt heterogeneity,
surgical patients could receive either the full beneﬁt or only a
limited beneﬁt from surgery. Indirect costs include missed work-
days, lost earnings, and disability payments. A QALY is a unit
used to measure both life expectancy and quality of life. One
QALY represents a year spent in perfect health, while years spent
in imperfect health are represented by some fraction of one. For
our case study, we obtained data from Oregon on health plan
enrollment by age category. Dependents were excluded from the
study. In 2012, more than 40,000 full-time and part-time state
workers were enrolled in one of the public employee plans that
required high co-payments for TKA. These data were combined
with information from the 2009 National Inpatient Sample and
population estimates from the US Census Bureau to estimate the
age distribution of Oregon state employees undergoing a TKA.
Finally, we used the median income for Oregon state employees
in 2009 to estimate the costs of missed time from work [19].Results
The results demonstrate that TKA is a highly cost-effective
surgical treatment and can yield net societal savings when
factoring in indirect costs, such as the impact of knee OA on
employment and productivity. As presented in Table 1, direct
medical costs for the surgical cohort exceeded those of the
nonsurgical cohort by an average of $19,207 and those receiving
a TKA rather than continued nonsurgical treatment received 1.9
additional QALYs over the model time horizon. This translates
into an incremental cost of $10,108 per QALY gained in a
population of similar age and income to Oregon state workers.
Beneﬁts in terms of reduced indirect costs (i.e., savings) were
higher with TKA than with nonsurgical treatment in all age groups.
Indirect cost beneﬁts, which primarily come from higher income as
a result of higher levels of employment and earnings for the
employed in the surgically treated cohort, vary by age because the
length of work life remaining varies with age. For example, we
estimated that a TKA for a 42-year-old worker suffering from end-
stage OA yields a societal savings of $164,687 (or $155,531 excluding
disability payments [Disability payments could be viewed as trans-
fers between the government and recipients. Thus, we present
results after excluding reductions in disability payments]). For those
aged between 60 and 64 years, we estimated that each TKA yieldsTable 1 – Societal savings from total knee arthroplasty.
Age
group
(y)
Net societal savings
(B þ C þ D  A) ($)
Total societal
savings (B þ C þ D)
($)
D
med
(
40–44 145,221 164,687 1
45–49 116,215 135,874 1
50–54 82,719 102,570 1
55–59 45,235 65,260 2
60–64 5,393 25,638 2
Overall 43,842 63,708 1
Note. Overall category is the component of each column weighted by Oran average societal saving of $25,638 (or $23,472 excluding disability
payments). Using the estimated age distribution of Oregon state
workers, we found an average total and net (of increased direct
medical costs) societal savings of $63,708 and $43,842 per worker
undergoing a TKA, respectively.
As presented in Table 2, a delay in receiving surgical care,
because of higher co-payment or other reasons, reduced the
societal savings from TKA. This occurred because beneﬁts accrue
over a shorter period of time with delay. Relative to a case with
no delay, a delay of 3 years reduced net societal savings from
$43,842 to $18,999. Once the TKA procedure has been delayed for
more than 7 years, the societal savings turn into a loss. A delay of
10 years results in a societal loss of $6417.Discussion
Effective implementation of VBID principles could be a useful tool
for creating a more efﬁcient health care system in the United
States. Although the state of Oregon was among the ﬁrst to apply
these principles to a state program, the adoption of VBID and
other cost-sharing policy mechanisms is expected to become
increasingly common. An estimated 59% of health plans in the
United States use monetary penalties to encourage patients to
choose more cost-effective treatment options, and many plans
ﬁnancially incentivize patients to participate in shared decision
making before treatment [20]. As health care costs continue to
rise, such trends toward value-based insurance design are likely
to continue as a way to reduce spending.
Research demonstrating the extent to which VBID affects con-
sumer behavior is relatively limited, although studies have dem-
onstrated patient sensitivity to cost-sharing variations [21,22]. For
example, one study found that lower co-payments for highly valued
prescription drugs immediately boosted medication adherence,
while another showed a sharp increase in the use of relatively
high-cost procedures, such as hip and knee replacement, whenirect
ical costs
A) ($)
Difference in indirect costs
Household
income (B)
($)
Disability
payments (C)
($)
Missed
work days
(D) ($)
9,467 155,160 9,156 371
9,659 127,269 8,378 227
9,851 95,780 6,721 69
0,025 60,639 4,666 45
0,245 23,522 2,166 50
9,207 59,291 4,414 3
egon state employee age distribution.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 7 4 9 – 7 5 1 751individuals become eligible for Medicare [2,23]. Recent evidence also
suggests that use of services may be more sensitive to increases in
cost sharing than reduced out-of-pocket expenses [6]. Thus, Ore-
gon’s policy—if more widely adopted—has the potential of reducing
or delaying the usage of TKA.
The policy in Oregon attempts to reduce the number of TKAs
and attendant direct costs through higher cost sharing on surgery
as well as subsidizing preventative care. Patients are not exempt
from additional out-of-pocket costs on the basis of the severity of
their condition or ﬁnancial circumstances. As a result, some of
those dissuaded from surgery may experience worse health out-
comes. Cost sharing will tend to have the largest effect on the
behavior of low-income individuals and may exasperate preexisting
socioeconomic disparities in health outcomes. This article, along
with other research, demonstrates that these consequences can
indirectly harm patients, employers, and payers [18]. For some
cases, the sum of these costs may signiﬁcantly offset or exceed the
short-term ﬁnancial beneﬁts resulting from the policy. From a
national perspective, the ﬁnancial impact of one state’s insurance
policy for state workers may not appear noteworthy. Oregon’s
policy, however, likely reﬂects broader trends in beneﬁt design.
The approach to beneﬁt design other payers follow will signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence health care delivery in coming years.
There is widespread concern over rising health care costs in the
United States. Although some of the observed increases in health
spending likely contribute to improved quality of life, there is also
evidence of inefﬁciency. A portion of geographic variation in costs is
commonly attributed to overutilization that is triggered by fee-for-
service payments [24]. Cost sharing can balance incentives to over-
treat by encouraging patients to question whether a proposed
treatment option is worth the expense. In searching for savings,
policymakers will naturally be drawn to procedures of particularly
high cost, such as knee replacement. Although it is true that
discouraging inappropriate knee replacements is beneﬁcial, discour-
aging appropriate procedures is costly. Cost sharing may be too blunt
an instrument to efﬁciently approach this trade-off when dealing
with services that are cost-effective for at least some patients.
Employers that self-insure have an obvious incentive to
consider productivity effects from treatment when making cover-
age determinations. Third-party payers, however, may be reluc-
tant to consider productivity effects when considering the
beneﬁts of treatment. Gains from increased earnings and reduc-
tions in missed work appear to be entirely borne by the employee
and the employer. This point of view by some payers may be
shortsighted. To the extent payers want to provide a competitive
insurance product that offers access to “high-value” services to
their enrollees, this study demonstrates the beneﬁts of taking a
broader perspective in assessing cost-effectiveness. Plans that
choose to use ﬁnancial incentives that discourage the utilization
of certain services must do so carefully because the incorrect
implementation of such policies can result in both increased total
spending and reduced quality of care.
The widespread adoption of VBID similar to the plan introduced
by Oregon has the potential for unintended consequences that
result in societal losses. Although reducing unwarranted variation
in the use of certain high-cost services is a laudable goal, highly
cost-effective services should not be discouraged solely on the basis
of their cost. VBID policies should consider both the beneﬁts and
the costs when assessing the value of a service.Acknowledgments
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